The Independent Electoral Commission has defended its decision to contract Electoral Services International Inc. (ESI), a Canadian company, to provide equipment and technical services for The Gambia’s 2026 voter-registration exercise. However, the Commission’s explanation may not be enough to address growing concerns about transparency, data protection and the credibility of the institution responsible for managing the country’s elections.
In an interview with QTV, IEC Director of Communications Pa Makan Khan said ESI was selected through an open and competitive procurement process conducted in accordance with Gambia Public Procurement Authority regulations.
According to Mr. Khan, the company’s responsibilities are limited to supplying voter-registration equipment and providing technical and cybersecurity assistance. He insisted that ownership and custody of the voter database remain exclusively with the IEC.
“The data belongs to the IEC; the data is in the custody of the IEC,” he said, adding that ESI provides technical support to help the Commission manage the system and respond to possible technical problems.
But the explanation raises important questions.
Why did the IEC decide that a foreign company was better qualified than any Gambian technology company to participate in such a sensitive national exercise? What specific technical capacity did ESI demonstrate? Which other companies submitted bids, how were they scored and what was the total value of the contract?
The involvement of a foreign company is not automatically improper. ESI’s publicly available information indicates that it has worked on biometric voter-registration projects in countries including Fiji, Kenya and the Solomon Islands. The company says it has worked with Fiji’s electoral authorities for more than a decade, while independent reporting confirms that the Solomon Islands hired ESI for biometric voter registration in 2013 and subsequently continued using its technical services.
However, previous projects alone are not sufficient proof that a company should be entrusted with The Gambia’s voter-registration infrastructure. The IEC should publish ESI’s full performance history, technical qualifications, cybersecurity certifications, ownership details, references from previous electoral commissions and any record of contractual disputes or system failures.
The public also deserves to know whether ESI’s software has undergone an independent security audit. Where are the backup copies of the voter database stored? Are any copies accessible outside The Gambia? Can ESI technicians remotely enter the system? Who controls passwords, encryption keys and administrator privileges? What safeguards prevent voter information from being copied, altered or transferred without authorisation?
Mr. Khan said there are sufficient backups to protect the register if Election House is destroyed. While disaster recovery is necessary, the existence of backups creates additional questions about their location, control and security. Merely saying that the IEC owns the data does not explain who can technically access it.
The IEC’s assurances are further weakened by its troubled financial and procurement record.
A police investigation reportedly recommended that former IEC chairman Alieu Momarr Njai be prosecuted for alleged corruption and abuse of office following findings from a special audit. The same investigation reportedly raised concerns about unlawful allowances, transfers of election funds through personal bank accounts, procurement irregularities and an alleged overpayment connected to an earlier ESI contract. These remain allegations and recommendations rather than criminal convictions, but they cannot simply be ignored when assessing public confidence in the Commission.
The National Assembly’s Finance and Public Accounts Committee has also reported weaknesses in the IEC’s revenue management, procurement compliance and financial controls. FPAC raised concerns about millions of dalasis that were allegedly not remitted to the Consolidated Revenue Fund, missing receipts, personal accounts used for election expenditure and irregular payments to contractors.
These findings make transparency surrounding the latest ESI contract even more important. The IEC cannot rebuild trust by asking Gambians to accept verbal assurances. It must publish the tender notice, names of bidders, evaluation criteria, scoring report, GPPA approval, signed contract, payment schedule and data-protection agreement.
Public confidence has also been shaken by omissions from the provisional voter register. The IEC admitted that names were missing and said they had been restored, while political figures called for the publication of a complete register and greater transparency regarding duplicate registrations.
Mr. Khan said the Commission would provide nationwide figures on appeals and objections after the process closes. The provisional register was published on July 7, with voters given until July 20, 2026, to report errors, omissions and other concerns.
The central issue is therefore not simply whether ESI is Canadian. The real questions are whether the procurement process was transparent, whether the company was subjected to proper due diligence, whether Gambian voter data are adequately protected and whether an institution facing serious audit and procurement concerns can convincingly guarantee electoral integrity.
The IEC is managing the foundation of The Gambia’s December 5, 2026 presidential election. It must understand that public confidence cannot be demanded—it must be earned through openness, accountability and independently verifiable safeguards.
By Salieu Njie
