Justice Adenike J. Coker yesterday delivered a judgment dismissing a civil suit filed against former Vice President Isatou Njie Saidy regarding a land dispute in Tawto, Kombo North District.
The suit, filed by Kebba Sanna Jatta (for himself and the estate of Jerreh Jatta) and Freedom Company Limited, was dismissed primarily on the grounds of being statute-barred and for the 1st Plaintiff’s lack of locus standi in a representative capacity.
The 1st Plaintiff, Kebba Sanna Jatta, filed the suit for himself and on behalf of the estate of his late father, Jerreh (Freedom Company Limited)
Kebba Sanna Jatta claimed the defendant, Isatou Njie Saidy, had trespassed upon two plots of land belonging to his late father’s estate, measuring approximately 123m x 115m x 98m x 107.5m.
Kebba Sanna Jatta averred in his Statement of Claim that their family first became aware of the defendant’s presence on the land in 1994. He excused the delay in taking action because they feared the might of & repercussions from the defendant, who served as the Vice President of The Gambia from 1997 to 2017.
He claimed that when the Defendant was first noticed in 1994, she was merely doing seasonal farming, and the issue of title did not arise. He contended she did not acquire the title until 1998 and only stated her full ownership in 2017 when confronted but the suit commenced after the 1st Plaintiff’s late father died in 2017.
The defendant, Isatou Njie Saidy, said that she is the bona fide owner of the land, measuring approximately 130m x 100m x 107m x 75m x 63m.
She claimed to have acquired the land along with her husband since the early 1990s and has been in uninterrupted possession of the same since then.
Isatou Njie Saidy filed a Motion on Notice through her counsel, S. Sonko, Esq, on October 31, 2025, seeking an order to dismiss the civil suit for being statute-barred under Section 17(1) of the Limitation Act and/or for the Court’s lack of jurisdiction.
Alternatively, she sought an order to strike out the suit because the 1st Plaintiff lacked the necessary standing (locus standi) to sue on behalf of the beneficiaries of the estate.
On the issue of locus standi (standing to Sue). Counsel, S. Sonko, argued that the 1st Plaintiff, Kebba Sanna Jatta, lacked the necessary authority to sue on behalf of the beneficiaries of his late father’s estate.
In the court determination, Justice Coker first gave the definition of Locus standi. Locus standi was defined by the Court as the “legal right or capacity to bring an action,” which is a prerequisite for the Court to hear the matter.
On representative capacity, Justice Coker acknowledged that while a head of family may have locus standi to defend family property, a party suing in a representative capacity must demonstrate both personal standing and valid authority to sue for the beneficiaries.
Lack of authority, Justice Coker noted that the 1st Plaintiff claimed to sue on behalf of two deceased beneficiaries and others who had allegedly already received their share via vesting deeds. However, the 1st Plaintiff had not pleaded any document of authority to sue on their behalf.
Justice ruled to strike out the representative capacity of the 1st Plaintiff. This left the 1st Plaintiff suing only in his personal capacity, which the Justice Coker found was not supported by the averments or the reliefs claimed in the Statement of Claim.
Justice Coker found the suit to be incompetent and therefore struck it out, robbing the Court of its jurisdiction.
On the issue of Statute Bar, Counsel S. Sonko further submitted that the suit was statute-barred, citing Section 17(1) of the Limitation Act Cap 8.01, which prescribes 12 years for such an action.
Counsel Sonko contended that the cause of action arose in 1994, almost 30 years ago, as the Plaintiffs’ Statement of Claim said they first knew of the defendant’s presence on the land in 1994.
The Plaintiff’s Counsel, A.R. Gomez, opposed the submission of Counsel Sonko, arguing that the issue of title only arose later, and that the family’s fear of the defendant, who served as Vice President from 1997 to 2017, prevented them from asserting their rights earlier.
Justice Coker’s determination on the issue of limitation law. Justice Coker confirmed that a legal right to enforce an action is not perpetual and is limited by statute, meaning an action filed after the prescribed period is statute-barred. The question of when a cause of action arose is determined from the Plaintiffs’ Statement of Claim.
Justice Coker found that the Plaintiffs’ averments clearly established they knew of the defendant’s presence and farming on the land as far back as 1994. Even if the defendant’s alleged title acquisition occurred later in 1998, a period of 19 years had elapsed before the 1st Plaintiff’s father died in 2017, and 27 years elapsed before the suit was filed.
Justice Coker was unable to find any statutory or case law precedent that accepts “fear of a person in high office” as a defence for not pursuing a right until it is extinguished by the Limitation Act. While fraud is a viable exception to statute bar claims, Justice Coker found that if the alleged fraud (acquisition of leasehold in 1998) occurred, it “ought to have been discovered with due diligence” in the lifetime of the 1st Plaintiff’s father, who died in 2017.
In conclusion, Justice Coker agreed with the defendant’s Counsel that the cause of action arose in 1994, or at best in 1998. Finding that the 1st Plaintiff’s father “slept on his rights” for 27 years, Justice Coker ruled that the Plaintiffs’ rights had been extinguished Limitation Law, as the suit was filed well after the prescribed 12-year period.
In light of the findings on both the lack of locus standi and the suit being statute-barred, Justice Coker held that the suit was statute-barred and, accordingly, lacked the jurisdiction to determine the case and dismissed the case
Justice Coker awarded a cost ordering the Plaintiffs to pay D25,000 (Twenty-Five Thousand Dalasis) in favour of Isatou Njie Saidy (Defendant). The cost must be paid before the Plaintiffs are allowed to take any further step in respect of the matter. In
