Justice Ebrima Jaiteh ruled that Section 45(4)(b) of the Drug Control Act 2003, under which John Ebrima Carayol was charged, does not exist in the laws of The Gambia.
Justice Jaiteh of the High Court Criminal Division has granted bail to John Ebrima Carayol, a suspect charged by the Drug Law Enforcement Agency (DLEAG), after Justice Ebrima Jaiteh found that the statutory provision cited on the charge sheet does not exist in the laws of the country. A charge built on thin air
In his ruling, Justice Jaiteh granted the bail application filed by Carayol through his counsel, A. M. Dabo, setting bail at D500,000 and requiring two Gambian sureties, each bound in a recognisance of a like sum.
The Attorney General, represented by Senior State Counsel S. Camara, did not oppose the grant of bail but urged the court to impose stringent conditions.
The bail application was supported by an affidavit of fifteen paragraphs, sworn by Julia Jassey on 21st May 2026, to which a copy of the DLEAG charge sheet was attached as exhibit JJ1. The originating summons had been filed on the same date.
Upon examining the charge sheet, Justice Jaiteh found that Carayol stood charged under Section 45(4)(b) of the Drug Control Act 2003, a provision that, upon scrutiny of the relevant legislation, does not exist.
Justice Jaiteh noted that it was not a mere technical irregularity but a fundamental defect in the foundation of the prosecution. He explained that a person accused of a criminal offence is entitled to know, with certainty and precision, the nature of the accusation against him and the legal provision alleged to have been violated.
“Where the charging provision is non-existent, the foundation of the charge becomes fundamentally questionable,” Justice Jaiteh stated.
Justice Jaiteh further held that courts administer justice based on the law as enacted, not on assumptions as to what prosecuting authorities may have intended. To do otherwise, the court reasoned, would be to descend into speculation and deprive an accused person of the constitutional guarantees of due process and fair hearing.
The particulars of the alleged offence state that Carayol was found in possession of 1 gram and 671 milligrams of cocaine, described as a prohibited drug.
Justice Jaiteh acknowledged those factual allegations but held that, irrespective of their substance, the applicant remained in custody pursuant to a charge founded upon a statutory provision that does not exist, a circumstance the court found highly relevant in considering whether continued detention was justified.
Turning to the applicable law, Justice Jaiteh cited Section 126 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2026, which provides that a person charged with an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding three years shall, on application, be released on bail except where there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused person will commit another offence, attempt to evade trial, interfere with witnesses or investigations, destroy evidence, prejudice the proper investigation of the offence, or undermine the objectives of the criminal justice system, including the bail system.
Justice Jaiteh held that the language of the provision is significant: bail is the rule and detention the exception. He added that once a bail application is made, the burden lies on the circumstances of the case to demonstrate one or more of the statutory grounds justifying continued detention.
Regarding the matter, Justice Jaiteh found that no material had been placed before him, suggesting that Carayol was likely to abscond, interfere with witnesses, obstruct investigations, destroy evidence, commit further offences, or otherwise undermine the administration of justice.
Justice Jaiteh also grounded its decision in Section 19(2) of the Constitution, which guarantees every person the right to liberty and security of person and prohibits arbitrary arrest or detention. Justice Jaiteh emphasised that liberty is a constitutional right and not a privilege granted at the discretion of the State, and that pre-trial detention must always be justified by lawful and compelling reasons.
Having considered the totality of the circumstances, including the defective nature of the charge, the absence of any opposition from the State, and the constitutional protection of personal liberty, Justice Jaiteh granted the application. He admitted Carayol to bail pending the determination of the criminal proceedings against him.
The bail conditions imposed by Justice Jaiteh are as follows: bail is fixed at D500,000 (Five Hundred Thousand Dalasis); the applicant shall provide two Gambian sureties, each entering into a recognisance of D500,000; at least one surety must be a civil servant of not less than Grade 10 or a person of demonstrable financial means acceptable to the Registrar.
The sureties shall produce valid national identification documents and proof of residence; the applicant shall deposit his passport, if any, with the Registrar of the High Court and shall not apply for a replacement travel document without leave of the court.
The applicant shall report to the nearest DLEAG office once every two weeks until further order of the court; and the applicant shall attend court whenever required and shall not interfere, directly or indirectly, with any witness connected to the case.
Justice Jaiteh further ordered that a breach of any of the conditions may result in revocation of the bail, and directed the Officer-in-Charge of the prison to release Carayol forthwith upon compliance with those conditions unless he is otherwise lawfully held.
