The prosecution took a surprise turn in the case of Abdul Wahab Jobarteh at the Banjul Magistrates’ Court on Tuesday, applying to withdraw all four counts against the accused, including the attempted murder charge, claiming that more serious charges are being prepared following ongoing investigations.
The defence Counsel fired back, accusing the prosecution of bad faith and forum shopping, and urging the court to refuse consent to what they described as a frivolous and vexatious application.
The matter came before Principal Magistrate Krubally with Assistant Commissioner of Police Manga appearing for the Inspector General of Police and Counsel Adama Sillah representing the accused, who was present in court.
When the case was called, ACP Manga informed the court that the prosecution was making an application pursuant to Sections 78(1), 78(2)(a), and 78(2)(b) of the Criminal Offences Act to withdraw the matter from the court.
Asked by Magistrate Krubally to state his reasons, ACP Manga told the court that investigations into the matter were ongoing and that new facts were emerging which could lead the prosecution to consider additional and more serious charges against the accused. He argued that withdrawing the matter would prevent the record of the court from becoming untidy and avoid unnecessary delay, given the evolving nature of the case.
Manga cited Section 78(1) and Section 78(2)(b) of the Criminal Offences Act in support of the application, though he acknowledged that one of the subsections he initially cited was irrelevant to the circumstances, a point Magistrate Krubally immediately picked up on, asking pointedly why it had been raised at all.
ACP Manga further cited Section 78(4) of the Act, submitting that a withdrawal under that provision does not act as a bar to subsequent court proceedings. On that basis, he urged the court to discharge the accused and invited the court to grant the application.
Counsel Sillah rose in firm opposition, describing the application as made with malice and not in good faith, and advancing several grounds for the court to refuse it.
He argued first that there was no charge higher in gravity than attempted murder, one of the four counts already before the Banjul court and that the prosecution’s claim that it could come up with more serious charges was therefore entirely unfounded.
He told the court that the defence’s firm view was that the prosecution was engaged in forum shopping, and that the sole reason behind the withdrawal application was to move the case to a different forum.
Counsel Sillah pointed out that immediately after the accused was arraigned before the Banjul Magistrates’ Court on the initial date, he was rushed to the Kanifing Magistrates’ Court and charged with traffic offences, though bail was granted there as well.
He applied for the court to take judicial notice of the Kanifing charge sheet and submitted that it is trite law that litigation cannot be conducted piecemeal. The prosecution, he argued, could and should have consolidated all the charges before the Banjul court rather than splitting proceedings across two courts.
On the prosecution’s claim that investigations were still ongoing, Counsel Sillah submitted that this was contradicted by the prosecution’s own conduct. He argued that the very act of arraigning the accused before the court meant that investigations had been concluded, statements taken, and the accused formally charged, making any claim of incomplete investigations untenable and more prejudicial than probative.
Counsel Sillah also raised a concern about the practical consequences of granting the withdrawal. He told the court that once the matter was withdrawn, the prosecution could take the accused back into custody, an outcome he described as a direct violation of the accused’s constitutionally protected right to liberty under Section 19 and Chapter Four of the 1997 Constitution.
He submitted that courts are enjoined by the Constitution to serve as protectors of fundamental rights, and that this court, in particular, should send a clear signal that parties appearing before it must come prepared and in good faith.
He warned that granting the application would amount to the court surrendering the accused to the prosecution’s custody indefinitely, with no certainty as to when or even whether fresh charges would be preferred. Describing the withdrawal as part of a pattern designed to keep the accused in custody by other means, Counsel Sillah urged the court not to consent to the application, arguing that Section 78 of the Act expressly requires the court’s consent before any withdrawal can take effect, and that the court cannot in good conscience consent to a frivolous and vexatious application.
He concluded by submitting that withdrawal of the matter would occasion injustice, and urged the court to retain the case and protect the accused’s right to a fair hearing.
In his reply on points of law, ACP Manga expressed surprise that the defence was objecting to a withdrawal at all, describing it as a first in his experience. He maintained that Section 78(1) gives the court the discretion to grant the withdrawal and urged the court to discountenance the defence’s line of objection.
He submitted that the reference to Section 19 of the Constitution by the defence was irrelevant to the application, and invited the court to look at all the authorities he cited and grant the application accordingly.
Having heard the application, the defence’s objection, and the prosecution’s reply on points of law, Magistrate Krubally reserved his ruling. The case has been adjourned to Thursday, 2nd July 2026, at 1:00pm for the delivery of the ruling.
