Justice Sonia Akinbiyi dismisses Ebrima Dibba’s appeal, ruling that the Solicitor-General’s prosecution of a sedition charge required no personal fiat from the Attorney General.
Justice Sonia Akinbiyi of the High Court has dismissed an appeal by Ebrima Dibba against a ruling by Magistrate Krubally that the Solicitor-General works under the Attorney General and therefore requires no separate fiat to prosecute a charge of sedition.
Justice Sonia Akinbiyi upheld that position, affirming that the prosecution by the Solicitor-General is lawful and constitutes a valid prosecution under the authority of the Attorney General’s Office.
The appeal came from proceedings before Principal Magistrate Krubally, during which defence counsel Borry S. Touray argued that a fiat, that is, the personal written consent of the Attorney General, is a mandatory precondition before any person may be prosecuted for sedition under the Criminal Code.
The prosecution led by Commissioner Sanneh opposed that position, contending that no such fiat was required, given the Solicitor-General’s statutory authority to act on behalf of the Attorney General.
Magistrate Krubally ruled in favour of the prosecution, prompting Ebrima Dibba, through his counsel, to file an appeal to the High Court against Principal Magistrate Krubally’s ruling
The appeal was heard and determined by Justice Sonia Akinbiyi K.J.W., who delivered her ruling. The sole issue before her was whether the trial magistrate had jurisdiction to entertain the sedition charge in the absence of the written consent of the Attorney General as required by section 53(2) of the Criminal Code.
Before High Court presided by Justice Sonia Akinbiyi, Senior Counsel Borry S. Touray, counsel for Dibba, maintained the position he had advanced at the lower court: that section 53(2) of the Criminal Code mandatorily requires a fiat the personal written consent of the Attorney General before any person may be prosecuted for sedition under sections 51(1)(a) and 52 of the Criminal Code.
He argued that the Solicitor-General had conducted the prosecution without such a personal fiat, rendering the entire trial a nullity that ought to be set aside.
Counsel B.S. Touray further submitted that the prosecution by the Solicitor-General amounted to a flagrant violation of section 53(2), and that any proceedings conducted in breach of that requirement go to the root of the court’s jurisdiction, a defect serious enough to invalidate everything that followed.
The prosecution countered by relying on Section 2 of the Law Officers Act, Cap 7:02, arguing that the provision empowers the Solicitor-General, as an officer working alongside the Attorney General, to perform all functions of the Attorney General either in his absence or under his authority.
The prosecution maintained that the defence’s interpretation of the fiat requirement was misplaced, and that the appeal was an attempt to delay substantive proceedings rather than raise a genuine legal point.
Justice Akinbiyi, in her ruling, agreed with Magistrate Krubally’s ruling and prosecution position. Justice Akinbiyi held that while the term “fiat” typically implies express permission or personal authorisation, statutory provisions that grant broad powers to the Solicitor-General to perform the functions of the Attorney General can be interpreted as a standing authorisation or delegation.
Justice Akinbiyi reasoned, avert the need for a specific, case-by-case fiat in every instance, especially where the prosecution is being conducted under the general authority of the Attorney General’s Office.
Justice Akinbiyi further held that for any proceedings to be declared a nullity, the defect must be fundamental and go to the root of the jurisdiction or the charge itself. She added that a procedural irregularity that is curable, or where the underlying authority was validly exercised through a delegate, does not automatically render the entire proceedings a nullity.
“On the whole, I find that the defence’s reliance on a strict interpretation of ‘fiat’ overlooks the statutory empowerment of the Solicitor-General,” Justice Akinbiyi stated.
Justice Akinbiyi concluded that since the Law Officers Act allows the Solicitor-General to perform the functions of the Attorney General, a prosecution initiated by the Solicitor-General acting under the umbrella of the Attorney General’s Office is valid and constitutes a prosecution by the Attorney General.
The sedition charge against Ebrima Dibba was therefore found to have been initiated with the standing fiat and consent of the Attorney General, and the proceedings were declared not to be a nullity.
In reaching her decision, Justice Akinbiyi cited Nigerian appellate authorities, including Okonkwo v. State (1991) 7NWLR (PT. 204) 251 and A.G. Federation v. A.G. Abia State & Ors (2001) 11 NWLR (PT 725) 677.
Upon her findings, the appeal by Ebrima Dibba was dismissed for lacking merit. The matter is expected to proceed before Magistrate Krubally, where he has to defend the charge of sedition against him for allegedly insulting the President
